Abstract. In this paper we study a neural network model of self-organization. This model uses a variation of Hebb rule for updating its synaptic weights, and surely converges to the equilibrium status. The key point of the convergence is the update rule that constrains the total synaptic weight and this seems to make the model stable. We investigate the role of the constraint and show that it is the constraint that makes the model stable. For analyzing this setting, we propose a simple probabilistic game that abstracts the neural network and the self-organization process. Then, we investigate the characteristics of this game, namely, the probability that the game becomes stable and the number of the steps it takes.
Introduction
How does the brain establish connections between neurons? This question has been one of the important issues in Neuroscience, and theoretical researchers have proposed various models for self-organization mechanisms of the brain. In many of these models, competitive learning, or more speci cally, competitive variants of Hebb's rule have been used as a key principle. In this paper, we study one property of such competitive Hebb rules.
As one typical example of self-organization, \orientation selectivity" WH63] has been studied intensively. In the primary visual cortex (area17) of cats, there is some group of neurons that strongly reacts to the presentation of light bars of a certain orientation, which we call orientation selectivity. An interesting point is that in a very early stage after birth, every neuron reacts to all bars of every orientation. This indicates that orientation selectivity is obtained after birth; that is, each neuron selects one preferred orientation among all orientations. To explain the development of orientation selectivity, a considerable number of mathematical models have been investigated; see, e.g., Swi96] . Although these models may look quite di erent, most of them use, as a principal rule for modifying synaptic strength, a competitive variant of Hebb rule, which is essentially the same as the rule proposed in the pioneer paper of von der Malsburg Mal73], the ? Supported by ESPRIT LTR Project no. 20244 -ALCOM-IT and CICYT Project TIC97-1475-CE.
paper that rst gave a mathematical model for the development of orientation selectivity.
A Hebb rule is a simple rule for updating, e.g., the weight of connection between two neurons. The rule just says that the connection between two neurons is strengthened if they both become active simultaneously. This rule has been used widely for neural network learning. Von der Malsburg constrained this updating rule so that the total connection weight of one neuron are kept under some bound. In this paper, we call this variation of Hebb rule a constrained Hebb rule. He showed through computer experiments that orientation selectivity is surely developed with his constrained Hebb rule.
Since the work of von der Malsburg, many models have been proposed, and some have been theoretically analyzed in depth; see, e.g., Tan90]. For example, a feature of various constrained Hebb rules as a learning mechanism has been discussed in MM94]. Yet, the question of why orientation selectivity is obtained by following a constrained Hebb rule has not been addressed. Note that the development of orientation selectivity is di erent from ordinary learning in the sense that a neuron (or, a group of neurons) establishes a preference to one particular orientation from given (more or less) uniformly random orientation stimuli. In this paper, we discuss why and how one feature from equally good features is selected with a constrained Hebb rule.
In order to simplify our analysis, we propose a simple probabilistic game called \monopolist game" for abstracting Hebb rules. In monopolist game, an updating rule corresponds to game's rule, and the selectivity is interpreted as that a single winner of a game | monopolist | emerges. Then we prove that a monopolist emerges with probability one in games following a von der Malsburg type rule. On the other hand, we showed theoretical evidence supporting that (i) the chance of having a monopolist is low without any constraint, and (ii) a monopolist emerges even under a rule with a weaker constraint. These results indicates that the importance of constraint in Hebb rules (or, more generally, competition in learning) to select one feature from equally good features.
We also analyzed how fast a monopolist emerges in games following a von der Malsburg type rule. This analysis can be used, in future, to estimate the convergence speed of constrained Hebb rules. (In this extended abstract, some of the proofs are omitted. See DWY98] for those proofs.) 2 Von der Malsburg's Model and Monopolist Game
Here we rst explain brie y the model considered by von der Malsburg. (Von der Malsburg studied the selectivity for a set of neurons, but here we only consider its basic component.) Neural Network Structure We consider two layer neural network. In particular, we discuss here the orientation selectivity for one neuron, and thus, we assume that there is only one output cell. On the other hand, the input layer consists of 19 input cells that are (supposed to be) arranged in a hexagon like the ones in Figure 1 . We use i for indicating the ith input cell, and IN for the set of all input cells. Stimuli and Firing Rule We use 9 stimuli with di erent orientations (Figure 2) , which are given to the network randomly. Here indicates an input cell that gets input 1, and indicates an input cell that gets input 0. Where c inc (which is called a growth rate) and W 0 (total weight bound) are constants given as parameters. The rst formula may be considered as the original Hebb's rule; on the other hand, the second one is introduced in order to keep the total weight within W 0 . (In fact, it is kept as W 0 .) With this setting, von der Malsburg demonstrated that the selectivity is developed through computer simulations. Thus, it seems likely that some selection occurs even from uniformly random examples, and that the constraint of the von der Malsburg's rule is a key for such a selection. In this paper we would like to study this feature of the constrained Hebb rule. For this, we further simplify von der Malsburg's computation model, and propose the following simple probabilistic game.
Monopolist Game
Basic Rule: Consider a nite number of players. Initially they are given the same amount of money. The game goes step by step, and at each step, one of the players wins with the same probability. The winner gets some amount of money, while the other loses some. Details: A player who loses all his money is called bankrupt. Once a player becomes bankrupt, he cannot get any amount of money, though he can still win with the same probability. (See below for the motivation.) Goal: The game terminates if all but one player become bankrupt. If the survived player keeps enough money at that point, then he is called a monopolist. We call a situation when a monopolist appears monopoly.
Notations. We use n and n 0 to denote the number of players and that of remaining (not being bankrupt) players, and use i, 1 i n, to denote players' indices. Throughout this paper, each player's wealth is simply called a weight, and let w i denote the player i's current weight. Let I and W 0 respectively denote the initial weight of each player and the total amount of initial weights; that is, W 0 = nI.
The connection of this game with von der Malsburg's computation model is clear; each player's weight corresponds to total synaptic strength between the output cell and a set of input cells corresponding to one type of stimulus, and the emergence of a monopolist means that the network develops preference to one orientation. From this correspondence, it is natural to require that even a bankrupt player can win with the same probability 1=n, which re ects the fact that the probability of a stimulus of each orientation appears is the same no matter how neural connections are organized.
An updating rule of players' weights corresponds to a rule of changing synaptic strength in the network. Here we can state updating rules in the following way. (In the following, let i 0 denote the player who wins at the current step.) otherwise.
Here f inc and f dec are the amount of increment and decrement at each step respectively, and one type of monopolist game is speci ed by de ning f inc and f dec . In the following, we assume that these values are determined from w i , w i0 , n, and n 0 . From the relation to von der Malsburg's computation model, we require that both f inc and f dec are 0 if w i = 0; that is, once a player loses all money, he stays forever in the 0 weight state. (In the following, we will omit stating this requirement explicitly.)
Now we consider the rule that corresponds to the constrained Hebb rule of von der Malsburg's rule. It is de ned as follows with constant c inc .
f inc = c inc ; and f dec = c inc =n 0 :
(1) (Recall that n 0 is the number of currently remaining players.)
Note that with this rule, the total amount of wealth is kept constant. Thus, in this sense, it corresponds to von der Malsburg's rule, and we call it constrained rule. Note that we may also consider a similar rule such that f inc is not constant but proportional to w i . (Similarly, f dec is also proportional to w i .) This rule might be closer to the original von der Malsburg's rule. This di erence is, however, not essential for discussing the probability of having a monopolist, i.e., for our discussion in Section 3. On the other hand, there is a signi cant di erence in convergence speed; but roughly speaking, the di erence disappears if we take the log of weight. Thus, we will discuss with the above simpler rule.
Importance of Competition
Here we compare three di erent updating rules for monopolist game, and show that constraint is important to derive a monopolist. From this, we could infer that some sort of constraint, (or, competition in more general) is important in learning rules for selecting one among the others through random process.
In the following, we consider the following three updating rules: (1) constrained rule, (2) local rule, and (3) semi local rule. Below we de ne these rules (except (1) that has been de ned in the previous section) and discuss the probability P that a monopolist emerges. Constrained Rule We show that under constrained rule, P is 1, that is, a monopolist emerges with probability 1.
A monopolist game in general expressed by an one-dimensional random walk. More precisely, for any i, we can express the player i's wealth w i as the following random walk. Note that the particle (i.e., the weight w i ) moves to the left (resp., to the right) with probability 1 ? 1=n (resp., 1=n). The left (resp., right) end of the interval means that the player i becomes bankrupt (resp., a monopolist). Thus, these two ends are absorbing walls. In a monopolist game under constrained rule with n = 2, we have f inc = c inc =2 and f dec = c inc =2. Hence, the above random walk becomes standard one (see, e.g., Fel68]), and it is well-known that the particle in such a standard random walk goes to one of the absorbing walls in nite steps with probability 1. This proves that P = 1 when n = 2. Then by induction, we can prove P = 1 when n > 2; thus, we have the following theorem. Theorem 1. Under constrained rule, a monopolist emerges (in nite steps) with probability 1.
Local Rule
In constrained rule, for computing f dec , we need the number of remaining players; that is, weights cannot be updated locally. In general, in order to be competitive, an updating rule must not be local. Thus, to see the importance of competition, we consider here the following purely local updating rule.
f inc = c inc ; and f dec = c dec :
(2) Notice that for this local rule (and the next semi local rule), the notion of monopolist is less clear than constrained rule, because the notion of \enough amount of money" is not clear. Here we simply consider it as W 0 =2, a half of the total initial weight. That is, we regard a single surviver as a monopolist if his weight is more than W 0 =2; hence, P is the probability that the game reaches to the state where w i1 W 0 =2 for some i 1 and w i = 0 for the other i.
We rst discuss one feature of this updating rule. In the following, let us x c dec = 1. Our computer experiments show that the probability to have a single surviver (in a reasonable amount of steps) drops rapidly when c inc n + 1. The reason is clear from the following fact.
Theorem 2. Fix c dec to be one, and consider one player's weight. For any t, it increases, by t c inc n ? 1 on average, after t steps.
Thus, if c inc > n, then it is quite likely that all players increase their weights, and thus no bankrupt appears in the game. On the other hand, if c inc < n, then every player dies quickly, and hence, no monopolist occurs even though someone may become the last player. This means that the most crucial case is the case c inc = n. Next we discuss P for such a case.
Recall that P is the probability that, at some point in the game, all but one become bankrupt and that the survived player has weight W 0 =2. Since it is di cult to estimate P directly, we analyze the following probability P 0 instead of P : P 0 is the probability that at least one player's weight reaches to W 0 =2 and no more two players have weight larger than su ciently large value, say, kW 0 for some k > 0. Notice that if a monopolist emerges at some point, then clearly, someone needs to reach W 0 =2 in the game. Furthermore, it is unlikely that two players reach to kW 0 and one of them become bankrupt afterwards. Thus, we may regard P 0 as an upper bound of P . For this P 0 , we have the following bound.
Theorem 3. For which is less than 0.6 if k = 1. On the other hand, our computer experiments show that P is less than 0.5 for various sets of parameters. Semi Local Rule As a third updating rule, we consider somewhat mixture of the above two rules. It keeps a certain amount of locality, but it still has some constraint. This rule is de ned as follows. 
That is, we want to keep the total weight smaller than W 0 , where W 0 is the total initial weight. Thus, a winner can gain c inc (in net, c inc ? c dec ) if there is some room to increase its weight. In this case, only the winner needs to know the current total weight, or the amount of room to the limit W 0 , and the other players can update its weight locally.
Our computer experiments show that the probability P that a monopolist emerges is fairly large if c inc is large enough, say c inc 2n. On the other hand, P gets small when c inc is small, which is explained in the same way as local rule. Although we have not been able to prove that P is large for su ciently large c inc , we can give some analytical result supporting it.
Here instead of analyzing P , we estimate (i) the average number of steps until all but one players become bankrupt, and (ii) the average number of steps until the total weight (which is initially W 0 ) becomes W 0 =2. Let T n!1 and T W0!W0=2 denote the former and the latter numbers respectively. We prove below that T n!1 is smaller than T W0!W0=2 if W 0 is large enough. This means that it is likely that at the time when all but one players become bankrupt, the total weight, which is the same as the survivor's weight, is larger than W 0 =2, that is, the surviver is a monopolist.
Theorem 4. Fix again c dec to be one. For large n, if I (ln 6)n(n ? 2) and c inc 2n, then we have T W0!W0=2 > T n!1 .
E ciency Analysis
In this section we discuss how fast a monopolist emerges in games with constrained rule. We estimate an upper bound on the average number of steps needed for monopoly to emerge, and we give some justi cation (not a rigorous proof) supporting that it is O(n 3 ln n(I=c inc ) 2 ). We start with some de nitions and notations that are used through the section. Here we modify our monopolist game and de ne a variant of monopolist game. Let game 0 denote the original monopolist game. We will denote by game 1 a variant of game 0 in which no bankrupt player can win. Thus, in game 1 , the winning probability of remaining players is 1=n 0 instead of 1=n. As we will see game 1 is useful for induction and it is easier to analyze.
These two game types are de ned on di erent probability spaces. Let us de ne them more precisely. For all two game types, (the execution of) a game is speci ed by a game sequence, i.e., a string from f1; . . . ; ng that de nes a history of winners. (Precisely speaking, we also need to consider in nite strings; but as we see below, we may ignore in nite strings.) We say that a game sequence x kills a player i if w i becomes 0 (or, negative) in the game following x just after the end of x, and we say that x derives a monopolist if the second last player is killed and monopoly emerges just after x. We say that a game sequence x is valid (resp., strongly valid) if it derives a monopolist and no pre x of it derives a monopolist (resp., x contains no indices of previously killed players). Note that the meaning of these notions may vary depending on game types. Now for any n, let X n (resp., Y n ) be the set of game sequences for n player games that are strongly valid w.r.t. game 0 (resp., valid w.r.t. game 1 ). For each x in X n , its probability Prfxg is n ?jxj . On the other hand, the probability f Prfyg of y 2 Y n depends on the number of remaining players, and it is rather complicated. (We omit specifying f Prfyg because it is not important for our discussion.) Note that X n and Y n are all pre x free. Also it is not hard to show that PrfX n g and f PrfY n g are one. (For example, PrfX n g = 1 follows from Theorem 1.) Therefore, we may regard X n and Y n as a probability space of the corresponding game, and we do not have to worry about in nite strings.
We denote by T (n; I 1 ; . . . ; I n ) (resp., T 1 (n; I 1 ; . . . ; I n )) the number of steps needed until monopoly emerges in game 0 (resp, game 1 ) with n players and initial weight I 1 ; . . . ; I n . When all the weights are equal, we use the simpler notation T (n; I). Our goal is to get some upper bound on E T (n; I)]. But instead, we will analyze an upper bound on E T 1 (n; I)], which gives us an upper bound on E T (n; I)], as the following lemma guarantees.
Lemma5. There exists c 1 such that for any su ciently large n and any I, we have E T (n; I)] c 1 nE T 1 (n; I) ]. Now we analyze the convergence speed of game 1 . For our analysis, we split a game execution into stages where each stage is a part of the game until some amount of players become bankrupt. More speci cally, we denote by t 1 (n; I 1 ; . . . ; I n ) the number of steps needed in a game with n players and initial weights I 1 ; . . . ; I n until at least 1 player becomes bankrupt. The following lemma relates the two terms T 1 (n; I 1 ; . . . ; I n ) and t 1 (n; I 1 ; . . . ; I n ).
Lemma6. For any n and I 1 ; . . . ; I n , there exists a constant c 2 , c 2 1, and weights I 0 1 ; . . . ; I 0 n?c2 such that the following inequality holds.
E T 1 (n; I 1 ; . . . ; I n )] E t 1 (n; I 1 ; . . . ; I n )] + E T 1 (n ? c 2 ; I 0 1 ; . . . ; I 0 n?c2 )]: Proof. Let Y Y n be the set of all valid game sequences y such that the number of players becomes strictly smaller than n for the rst time just after y. By de nition of E T 1 (n; I 1 ; . . . ; I n )], we have the following equality. X
